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Abstract
In light of the growing interest in agent-based market models, we bring
together several earlier works in which we considered the topic of self-
consistent market modelling. Building upon the binary game structure
of Challet and Zhang, we discuss generalizations of the strategy reward
scheme such that the agents seek to maximize their wealth in a more direct
way. We then examine a disturbing feature whereby such reward schemes,
while appearing microscopically acceptable, lead to unrealistic market dy-
namics (e.g. instabilities). Finally, we discuss various mechanisms which
are responsible for re-stabilizing the market in reality. This discussion
leads to a ‘toolbox’ of processes from which, we believe, successful market
models can be constructed in the future.
Oxford Center for Computational Finance working paper: OCCF/010702
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1 Introduction
Agent-based models have attracted significant interest across a broad range of
disciplines [1]. An increasingly popular application of these models has been
the study of financial markets [1, 2]. The motivations for this focus on financial
markets are two-fold: the promise that data-rich financial markets are good
candidates for the empirical study of complex systems, and the inadequacy of
standard economic models based on the notions of equilibria and rational expec-
tations. Currently many different agent-based models exist in the Econophysics
literature, each with its own set of implicit assumptions and interesting proper-
ties [1, 2, 3]. In general these models manage to exhibit some of the statistical
properties that are reminiscent of those observed in real-world financial markets;
for example, fat-tailed distributions of returns and long-timescale volatility cor-
relations. Despite their differences, these models draw on several of the same key
ideas: feedback, frustration, adaptability and evolution. The underlying goal of
all this research effort is to generate a microscopic agent-based model which (i)
reproduces all the stylized facts of a financial market, and (ii) makes sense on
the microscopic level in terms of financial market microstructure. While each
of these goals is separately achievable, the combination of (i) and (ii) within a
single model represents a fascinating challenge, and underpins our motivation
for writing the present paper.
Challet and Zhang’s Minority Game [3] offers possibly the simplest paradigm
for a system containing the key features of feedback, frustration and adaptabil-
ity. The MG has remarkably rich dynamics, given the simplicity of its under-
lying binary structure, and has potential applications in a wide range of fields.
Consequently Challet and Zhang’s MG model, together with the original bar
model of Arthur [1], represent a major milestone in the study of complex sys-
tems. Given the MG’s richness and yet underlying simplicity, the MG has also
received much attention as a financial market model [2]. The MG comprises an
odd number of agents N choosing repeatedly between the options of buying (1)
and selling (0) a quantity of a risky asset. The agents continually strive to make
the minority decision i.e. buy assets when everyone else is selling and sell when
everyone else is buying. This strategy seems to make sense on first inspection.
For example, a majority of agents selling will force the price of the asset down
and thus ensure a low buy price (which is favorable) for the minority of the
agents who decided to buy; hence the minority group has ‘won’. However, now
consider the scenario where this pattern repeats over and over. The minority
of agents, who have been buying more and more assets as the price falls, now
find themselves holding a huge inventory of assets which are worth very little.
When these agents try to cash in their assets, they will find themselves very
much poorer. Surely then the minority group has actually lost?
This paradox has sparked much discussion as to the suitability of the MG as
the basis of a microscopic model of financial markets. Consequently a diverse
range of modified (yet MG-related) models have emerged, all seeking to address
this point in different ways [2]. Some models include a combination of different
types of agents - in particular, agents who are rewarded for trading in the
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minority, and agents who are rewarded oppositely for trading in the majority
(see Ref. [4] for an early example). In such models, the overall class of the
game (minority or majority) is ambiguous, and is likely to change as differing
numbers of each group flood in and out of the market. Other models try to
combine the two different reward structures, thus requiring only one class of
agents who strive to be neither exclusively in the minority group nor exclusively
in the majority group [5, 6, 7]. We refer the reader to the Econophysics website
[2] for further examples (see also Refs. [8, 9, 10, 11]).
The purpose of this paper is to consolidate the search for a suitable micro-
scopic reward scheme for use in agent-based financial markets. The paper com-
prises a synthesis of several earlier reports, each aimed at addressing the topic
of self-consistent agent-based market modelling within a binary game structure.
These earlier reports are re-organized in light of several recent papers on specific
reward structures, and supplemented by additional simulation results, observa-
tions and thoughts [7]. We start by discussing various strategy reward schemes
in which the agents seek to maximize their wealth in a direct way. We then
illustrate a disturbing feature whereby such reward structures, while appearing
microscopically acceptable, can lead to unrealistic market dynamics (e.g. in-
stabilities). Finally, we discuss various mechanisms which are responsible for
re-stabilizing the market in reality. This discussion leads to a ‘toolbox’ of pro-
cesses from which, we believe, successful market models can be constructed in
the future.
2 Binary game structure
Consider the situation of a population of N agents with some limited global
resource. A specific example could be Arthur’s famous bar problem [1] where
there are N regular bar-goers but only L < N seats. The reward scheme in
Arthur’s bar problem is simple: bar-goers are successful if they attend and
they manage to obtain a seat. This reward scheme implicitly assumes that
the bar-goers value sitting down above other criteria. While this makes sense
for many situations, it is not universal. For example, it is our experience that
customers of college-based bars do not view seating as a necessary requirement
for a successful evening! The motto ‘the more the merrier’ often seems more
appropriate. The MG represents a very special case of the bar problem, in which
the seating capacity L = (N − 1)/2 and all the attendees wish to sit down. In
more general and realistic situations, the correct reward scheme is likely to be
less simple than either Arthur’s bar model or Challet and Zhang’s MG. Until a
specific reward scheme is defined, the bar model remains ill-specified. Putting
this another way, the precise reward scheme chosen is a fundamental property of
the resulting system and directly determines the resulting dynamical evolution.
Hence it is crucial to understand the effect that different microscopic reward
schemes have on the macroscopic market dynamics.
As first discussed in Ref. [1], the bar problem is somewhat analogous to a
financial market where the bar-goers are replaced by traders. In the same way
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that a general bar problem requires a non-trivial reward scheme, any ‘correct’
agent-based market model will need a non-trivial reward scheme in order to
avoid inconsistencies with financial market microstructure. This provides us
with the motivation to look beyond the bar model and MG, in order to design
an agent-based model with financial relevance. Having said this, the binary
structure of the MG provides an appealing framework for formulating a market
model without introducing too many obvious pathologies. Given these consider-
ations, our discussion from here on will not assume any specific reward scheme,
but will employ a binary game structure based on Ref. [3].
We start by reviewing the binary game structure. There are three basic
parameters; the number of agents N , the ‘memory’ of the agents m, the number
of strategies held by each agent s. The agents all observe a common binary
source of information, but only remember the previousm bits. Hence the global
information available to each agent at time t is given by µ [t] where in decimal
notation µ [t] ∈ {0 . . . P − 1} with P = 2m. Each strategy aR contains as its
elements aµR, and represents a response {−1, 1} to each of the possible P values
of the global information µ. There are hence 2P possible strategies. The agents
are randomly allocated a subset of s of these strategies at the outset of the
game, and are not allowed to replace these. The agents also keep a score SR
reflecting their strategies’ previous successes, whether the strategy is played or
not. The net action of the agents A [t] is defined as:
A [t] =
2P∑
R=1
nR [t] a
µ[t]
R
where nR is the number of agents playing strategy R. The agents always play
their highest performing strategy, i.e. the strategy with the highest SR. The
strategy score is updated with payoff gR such that SR [t+ 1] = SR [t]+gR [t+ 1].
The central question is the following: what should we take as ‘success’ in
the context of a market and hence what are the payoffs? In short, what is
the microscopic reward scheme? This is equivalent to asking what the game
actually is, since a game requires a definition of the players’ goals and hence
their rewards. In order to address this question, we start by considering a binary
version of Arthur’s bar problem with general L, i.e. an MG-like model which is
generalized to L 6= (N − 1)/2 [12, 13]. The two responses would be ‘attend’ or
‘don’t attend’, and there are two possible scenarios: (i) the attendance is less
than the seating capacity. In this case, the attendees are successful while those
who didn’t attend are unsuccessful. (ii) The attendance exceeds the seating
capacity. In this case, the attendees are unsuccessful while those who didn’t
attend are successful. Setting L = (N − 1)/2 yields the MG, and the two
scenarios collapse into one: the successful agents are those who predict the
minority group, i.e. attend when the minority attend, or don’t attend when the
majority attend. [For a study of the binary game with L 6= (N − 1)/2, see Ref.
[12, 13].] In the specific case of the MG, success is classified as having correctly
predicted the minority outcome. The payoff function for the MG is thus of the
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form:
gR [t+ 1] = χ
[
−a
µ[t]
R A [t]
]
(1)
where χ [x] is an odd, increasing function of x usually chosen to be either
χ [x] = x or χ [x] = sgn [x]. The feedback in the MG arises through the global
information µ [t] where the most recent bit of the binary information is defined
by the sign of the net action of the agents A [t]:
µ [t+ 1] = 2µ [t]− P H
[
µ [t]−
P
2
]
+H [A [t]] (2)
where H [x] is the Heaviside function [14]. In the more general form of the game
where the resource level L 6= (N − 1)/2, the argument in the Heaviside function
H [. . . ] would depend on the value of L [13]. More generally it could become a
complicated function of all the game parameters, or include feedback from the
macroscopic dynamics in the past, or even the effects of exogenous news arrival.
It is now accepted that a generalization of the MG in which agents can sit
out of the game (i.e. aµ[t] = 0) when they are not confident of the success of
any of their s strategies, provides a better model of financial trading since it
allows the number of agents active in the market to vary. This more general
model is the Grand Canonical Minority Game (GCMG) which was first studied
in Ref. [11]. The GCMG typically has two more parameters than the MG:
namely T which is a time horizon over which strategy scores are forgotten (i.e.
SR [t+ 1] = (1− 1/T )SR [t] + gR [t+ 1]) and r which is a threshold value of
SR below which the agents will opt not to participate in the game (a
µ[t] = 0).
The GCMG seems to reproduce the stylized statistical features of a financial
time-series over a wide parameter range (see the discussion in Ref. [15]).
3 The price formation process
It is commonly believed that in a financial market, excess demand (i.e. the
difference between the number of assets offered and the number sought by the
agents) exerts a force on the price of the asset. Furthermore it is believed that a
positive excess demand will force the price up and a negative demand will force
the price down. A reasonable suggestion for the price formation process could
then be [16]:
ln [p [t]]− ln [p [t− 1]] =
D [t−]
λ
(3)
or
p [t]− p [t− 1] =
D [t−]
λ
(4)
where D [t−] represents the excess demand in the market prior to time t, when
the new price p [t] is set and the buy/sell orders are executed. The scale param-
eter λ represents the ‘market depth’ (or liquidity) i.e. how sensitive a market
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is to an order imbalance. In general we would expect λ to be some increasing
function of the number of traders N trading in that asset. Also, the functional
forms may not be linear as in Equations 3 and 4. However, studies carried out
on several markets have found the forms of Equations 3 and 4 to be reasonable
[17].
In Ref. [4], we suggested that in markets involving a market-maker who
takes up the imbalance of orders between buyers and sellers, the market-maker
will wish to manipulate the price of the asset in order to minimize her inventory
of stock φM [t]. Whilst the market-maker’s job is to execute as many of the
orders as is possible, she does not wish to accumulate a high position in either
direction. To this end, the market-maker lowers the price to attract buyers
when she holds a long position φM > 0 and raises it to attract profit-taking
sellers when she has a short position φM < 0. This modifies the price formation
of Equation 3 to1:
ln [P [t]]− ln [P [t− 1]] =
D [t−]
λ
−
φM [t
−]
λM
(5)
where λM is the market-maker’s sensitivity to her inventory.
4 From MG to market model
Our puzzle is to form a sensible model of a collection of traders buying and
selling a financial asset. It is clear from Sections 2 and 3 that we have two
pieces of the puzzle. The MG gave us a simple paradigm for a group of agents
interacting in response to global information and adapting their behavior based
on past experience. The output of this model was a ‘net action’ A [t]. In
addition, we now have some simple systems for price-formation based on an
excess demand D [t]. But what relationship should we assume between D [t] and
A [t]? To answer this question, we should clarify what we want the individual
actions a
µ[t]
R of the strategies to resemble. In short, the question is ‘what does
a strategy map from and to?’
In most studies of the MG as a market model, researchers have taken the
actions a
µ[t]
R ∈ {−1, 1} to be the actions of selling and buying a quanta of the
asset respectively. Thus the net action of all agents A [t] naturally becomes the
excess demand, i.e. we have:
D
[
t−
]
= A [t− 1] (6)
Given this and the fact that the price change is an increasing function of excess
demand (for Equations 3 and 4), the global information becomes the directions
(up or down) of the previous price changes. So the answer here is that a strategy
maps from the history of past asset price movements to a buy/sell signal. A
strategy mapping from the history of past asset price movements seems a natural
1It is important to note that this price process is not abitrage-free i.e. it is possible for the
agents to make profit by manipulating the market maker.
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and sensible choice, since financial chartists do look at precisely this information
to decide upon a course of action. We therefore propose that in general, for this
class of market model, we should always use the following Equation (Eq. 7) to
update the global information, irrespective of whether Equation 6 holds.
µ [t+ 1] = 2µ [t]− P H
[
µ [t]−
P
2
]
+H [∆P [t+ 1, t]] (7)
It is worth now spending a few moments considering the timings in this
model. Equation 6 is for the excess demand at time t−, i.e. prior to time t
when all the orders are processed and a new price p [t] is formed. Thus D [t−]
can only result from all the information that is available at time t − 1, i.e.
µ [t− 1] and {SR [t− 1]}. From this information, the agents take actions a
µ[t−1]
producing a net action of A [t− 1]. The agents’ actions (orders) however do not
get realized (executed) until time t when the new price p [t] is known. The MG
payoff function of Equation 1, hence rewards agents positively for deciding to
sell (buy) assets (i.e. aµ[t−1] = −1 (1)) when the order execution price p [t] is
above (below) the price level at the time they made the decision (i.e. p [t− 1.]).
Why is this mechanism of moving in the minority a physically reasonable
ambition for the agents? Let us consider the ‘notional’ wealth of an agent i to
be given by:
Wi [t] = φi [t] p [t] + Ci (8)
where φi is the number of assets held and Ci is the amount of cash held. It
is clear from Equation 8 that an exchange of cash for asset at any price does
not in any way affect the agents’ notional wealth. However, the point is in the
terminology. The wealth Wi [t] is only notional and not real in any sense - the
only real measure of wealth is Ci which is the amount of capital the agent has
available to spend. Thus it is evident that an agent has to do a ‘round trip’ (i.e.
buy (sell) an asset then sell (buy) it back) to discover whether a real profit has
been made. Let us consider two examples of such a round trip. In the first case
the agent trades in the minority while in the second he trades in the majority:
• Moving in minority:
t Action a [t] Ci [t] φi [t] p [t] Wi [t]
1 Submit buy order 100 0 10 100
2 Buy..., Submit sell order 91 1 9 100
3 Sell 101 0 10 101
• Moving in majority:
t Action a [t] Ci [t] φi [t] p [t] Wi [t]
1 Submit buy order 100 0 10 100
2 Buy..., Submit sell order 89 1 11 100
3 Sell 99 0 10 99
As can be seen, moving in the minority creates wealth for the agent upon com-
pletion of the necessary round-trip, whereas moving in the majority loses wealth.
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However if the agent had held the asset for any length of time between buying
it and selling it back, his wealth would also depend on the rise and fall of the
asset price over the holding period. Thus the MG mechanism seems perfectly
reasonable for a collection of traders who simply buy/sell on one timestep and
sell/buy back on the next, but this is not of course what real financial traders
do in general. This pinpoints the main criticism of the MG as a market model.
5 Modified payoffs
The minority mechanism at play in the MG, arises solely from Equation 1 for
the payoff (reward) gR [t+ 1] given to each strategy R based on its action a
µ[t]
R .
Thus it can be trivially conjectured that changing the structure of the payoff
function will change the class of game being played. In Section 4 we pointed
out that although trading in the minority was beneficial, the minority payoff
structure itself made no allowance for the rise or fall in the value of the agent’s
portfolio φi of assets. Let us try to rectify this by examining the form of the
agent’s notional wealth, Equation 8. If we differentiate the notional wealth, we
get an expression for ∆Wi [t+ 1, t] =Wi [t+ 1]−Wi [t] given by:
∆Wi [t+ 1, t] = ∆Ci [t+ 1, t] + p [t+ 1]∆φi [t+ 1, t] + φi [t] ∆p [t+ 1, t]
The first two terms cancel because the amount of cash lost −∆Ci [t+ 1, t] is
used to buy the extra ∆φi [t+ 1, t] assets at price p [t+ 1]. This leaves us with:
∆Wi [t+ 1, t] = φi [t] ∆p [t+ 1, t] (9)
We can then use Equation 9 to work out an appropriate reward gR [t+ 1] for each
strategy based on whether its action a
µ[t]
R induced a positive or negative increase
in notional wealth. Let us first use the fact that the price change ∆p [t+ 1, t]
is roughly proportional to the excess demand D
[
(t+ 1)−
]
: this can be seen
explicitly from our earlier equation for the price formation, Equation 4. Then
let’s use our MG interpretation of the net action A [t], Equation 6. We thus
have from Equation 9:
∆WR [t+ 1, t] ∝ φR [t]D
[
(t+ 1)−
]
∝ φR [t]A [t]
We then identify the accumulated position of a strategy at time t, φR [t], to
be the sum of all the actions (orders) made by that strategy which have been
executed within times 0 . . . t. Remembering that at time t, the action (order)
a
µ[t]
R has not yet been executed (it gets executed at t + 1), this gives φR [t] =∑t−1
i=0 a
µ[i]
R . Let us then set the payoff given to a strategy gR [t+ 1], to be an
increasing (odd) function χ of the notional wealth increase ∆WR [t+ 1, t] for
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that strategy. We thus arrive at:
gR [t+ 1] = χ
[
t−1∑
i=0
a
µ[i]
R ×A [t]
]
(10)
We could also propose a locally-weighted equivalent of Equation 10, in which
the reward given to a strategy is more heavily weighted on the result of its recent
actions than the actions it made further in the past. This gives
gR [t+ 1] = χ
[
t−1∑
i=0
(1− 1/T )
t−1−i
a
µ[i]
R ×A [t]
]
(11)
where T enumerates a characteristic time-scale over which the position accu-
mulated by the strategy is ‘forgotten’. The T = 1 limit of Equation 11 yields
gR [t+ 1] = χ
[
a
µ[t−1]
R A [t]
]
, i.e. only the position resulting from the most re-
cently executed trade is taken into account. With T = 1, this payoff structure
essentially rewards a strategy at time t+1 based on whether the notional wealth
change ∆WR [t+ 1, t] wasmore positive than it would have been if action a
µ[t−1]
R
had not been taken.
If Equation 11 is used in an agent-based market model, the agents play
the strategy they hold which has accumulated the highest ‘virtual’ notional
wealth. We mean ‘virtual’ in the sense that the strategy itself will not have
actually accumulated this notional wealth unless it has been played without fail
since time t = 0. The agents in this model are thus all striving to increase their
notional wealth and are allowed to do so by taking arbitrarily large positions φi.
We will call this incarnation of the market model $G11: the term ‘$G’ is
named after the ‘The $-Game’ of Ref. [5] where agents also strive to maximize
notional wealth, and ‘11’ is named after Equation 11 for the strategy payoff.
We stress that this incarnation of the market model is by no means unique.
For example, it may be more appropriate to consider a model wherein each
agent is only allowed one position in the asset at any time, i.e. φi [t] = −1, 0, 1.
This amounts to us redefining the strategies R as mapping to the actions ‘go
long/short’ instead of ‘buy/sell’, i.e. a
µ[t]
R = φR
[
(t+ 1)
−
]
. Note the reference
to (t+ 1)
−
here because the action a
µ[t]
R is not executed until time t+ 1: after
this time a
µ[t]
R = φR [(t+ 1)] . In this new model, the net action of the agents
A [t] therefore represents the overall desired position of the population at time
(t+ 1)−, i.e. A [t] =
∑N
i=1 φi
[
(t+ 1)−
]
. It therefore follows that the excess
demand is given by:
D
[
(t+ 1)−
]
=
N∑
i=1
(
φi
[
(t+ 1)−
]
− φi [t]
)
= A [t]−A [t− 1] (12)
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Similarly, for this system, the payoff to strategies based on the notional wealth
increase is given by Equation 9 as:
gR [t+ 1] ∝ χ [φR [t]∆p [t+ 1, t]]
= χ
[
a
µ[t−1]
R (A [t]−A [t− 1])
]
(13)
We will call this incarnation of the market model $G13. The payoff
structure for this one-position-per-agent system is essentially the same as that
reported in Equation [3] of ‘The $-Game’ [5].
6 Behavior of market models
In the previous section, we introduced different microscopic reward schemes for
use in binary multi-agent market models. The aim of these new strategy payoff
structures, was to get the agents to maximize their notional wealth as given
by Equation 8. This seems to be a more physically realistic goal than to have
the agents competing to always be in the minority group, as in the MG and its
variants. The question now must be: how do these new payoff structures affect
the resultant dynamics of the market model? To investigate this, we identify
the form of the excess demand in the model and then employ a price formation
structure - from Section 3 for example. The table below illustrates three possible
market models:
Name φR [t] D
[
(t+ 1)
−
]
gR [t+ 1] = sgn [. . . ] ∆P [t+ 1, t]
GCMG φR [t− 2] + a
µ[t−1]
R A [t] −a
µ[t]
R D
[
(t+ 1)
−
]
D
[
(t+ 1)
−
]
/λ
$G11 φR [t− 2] + a
µ[t−1]
R A [t]
∑t−1
i=o a
µ[i]
R D
[
(t+ 1)
−
]
D
[
(t+ 1)
−
]
/λ
$G13 a
µ[t−1]
R A [t]−A [t− 1] a
µ[t−1]
R D
[
(t+ 1)−
]
D
[
(t+ 1)−
]
/λ
We have simulated the three market models in the above table with the
same parameters for each model: N = 501 agents, s = 2 strategies per agent,
T = 100 timesteps for the strategy score time-horizon, and an r = 4 payoff
point confidence-to-play threshold. Each simulation was run for agents with
low memory m = 3 and for agents with high memory m = 10. The resultant
price p [t] and volume v [t] =
∑2P
R=1 nR are displayed in Figure 1.
The two different values of the agent’s memory length (or rather the ratio
P/N) describe markets in two distinctly different ‘phases’. Arguably the most
important feature of these types of model is that there is a common perception
of a strategy’s (virtual) success, i.e. SR [t] is a global variable. This implies
that the number of agents adopting the same action (i.e. the effect of crowd-
ing or herding) is dependent on the number which hold each strategy. At low
10
Figure 1: Behaviour of price and volume in market models corresponding to
three different strategypayoff functions gR [t]. Parameters for each model are
N = 501, s = 2, T = 100, r = 4. The left hand column represents the crowded
market with high agent coordination (m = 3) the right hand column represents
an uncrowded market with little agent coordination (m = 10). The top row
shows the GCMG, the second row shows the $G11 and the bottom row shows
$G13.
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memory (low P/N) there are few strategies available and many agents, conse-
quently large numbers of agents hold the same strategy. This implies that in
this ‘crowded phase’ there are large groups of agents adopting the same action
a
µ[t]
R (i.e. crowds) and only small groups adopting the opposite action −a
µ[t]
R
(i.e. anti-crowds) [18]. The result of this high agent coordination is a volatile
market with large asset price movements. Conversely, for high m (high P/N)
hardly any agents hold the same strategy. Hence the crowd size is roughly equal
to the anti-crowd size, resulting in a market with low agent coordination and
consequently lower volatility and fewer large changes. With this distinction be-
tween low and high m regimes in mind, let us briefly describe the dynamics in
each market model.
• GCMG. First consider low m. The confidence-to-play threshold is set
high enough in order that occasional stochasticity is injected via timesteps
when A [t] = 0 (N.B. the next state of µ [t+ 1] is then decided with a coin
toss). The GCMG can be seen to reproduce many of the statistical features
observed in real markets. Figure 1 shows that the activity (volume) is
generally low and bursty. The asset price series is thus characterized by
frequent large movements (giving fat-tailed distributions of returns) and
clustered volatility. No long periods of correlation exist in the GCMG asset
price movement: as soon as lots of agents start taking the same action,
then the strategies which produce that action are penalized, as can be seen
from Equation 1. At high m, the absence of agent co-ordination leads to
an absence of clustering of activity. Hence the series of asset prices appears
more random at high m.
• $G11. At low m, the asset price very soon assumes an unstoppable
trend: agents with at least one trend-following strategy (. . . A [t− 2] >
0, A [t− 1] > 0, A [t] > 0 ⇒ aR = 1) join the trend and benefit (no-
tionally) from the consequent asset price movement. Because the strate-
gies (and hence agents) are allowed to accumulate limitless positions, the
trend is self-reinforcing since ∆WR just keeps getting bigger for the trend-
following strategies. At high m, the lack of agent coordination means that
it is harder for the model to find this attractor. However sooner or later,
a majority of trend-following strategies will have accumulated sufficient
score SR and position |φR| to be played successfully. From then on, the
pattern of success is self-reinforcing and again the unstoppable trend is
created. This result has to be seen as the natural consequence of wanting
the agents to maximize notional wealth at the same time as being allowed
arbitrarily large positions.
• $G13. At low m, the model has interesting and irregular dynamical prop-
erties. For example, the series of asset price movements contains periods
of very high correlation (and high volume) and periods of very high anti-
correlation (and lower volume). These two behaviors arise from the payoff
structure of Equation 13: just as in $G11, strategies are rewarded for
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having a positive (negative) position when the asset price is trending up
(down), however they now get penalized for joining that trend. This im-
plies that persistent behavior will tend to follow persistent behavior, while
anti-persistent behavior will follow antipersistent behavior. This finding
is very much in line with the school of thought that says that markets
have distinct ranging and breakout phases. Unlike the $G11 model, the
trends are always capped by the limitation that agents can only hold one
position. Once as many agents as possible are long (short) the asset price
cannot rise (fall) any further: consequently the resulting dynamics are
strongly mean-reverting. At high m, due to the lack of agent coordina-
tion, it is hard for large enough crowds to arise to form trending periods.
Thus anti-persistence dominates this regime.
7 Instability in market models
In the MG, there is no unstable attractor which could give rise to a continuously
diverging price. The reason is that each agent is trying to do the opposite of the
others. This results in no net long-term market force. The MG agents can see
no advantage in collectively forcing a price up (down) to increase the value of
their long (short) position, since they are totally unaware of their accumulated
position. Section 6 showed however that, when we give the agents the goal of
maximizing their notional wealth (cash plus value of position), the model can be
dominated by the unstable dynamics of price trending. Although the structure
of the $G models seems more realistic than the MG, the price dynamics do not
reproduce many of the stylized features of financial asset price series. It seems
that an improvement in the microscopic model structure ‘spoils’ the macroscopic
results. To help explain this, we now look at some of the model deficiencies which
still remain.
7.1 Market impact
We hinted at this effect in Section 4. The wealth Wi [t] that we have forced the
agents of the $G models to maximize, is purely notional - it is the wealth they
would have if they could unwind their market positions at today’s price p [t].
The agents are clearly not able to do this. There are two reasons for this. Even
if an agent put in an order to unwind his position at time t, it would not be
executed until time t + 1 when the price is p [t+ 1]. The second reason is that
in this simplistic structure, the agents can only trade one quanta of asset at
any time. Hence a position of φi assets will take φi timesteps to fully unwind.
All other things being equal, an agent should expect on average to get less cash
back than φi [t] p [t] when unwinding his position. This is ‘market impact’. We
can see this effect directly with the following argument:
The change in cash of agent i from buying ∆φi [t, t− 1] assets at time t is given
by: ∆Ci [t, t− 1] = −∆φi [t, t− 1] p [t]. Let us then use Equation 4 to give
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p [t] = p [t− 1] +D [t−] /λ. Then we break down the demand as follows:
D
[
t−
]
= di +
N∑
j 6=i
dj
[
t−
]
where dj is the demand of agent j. However we know that the demand of agent
i is ∆φi [t, t− 1] assets, hence we get
∆Ci [t, t− 1] = −∆φi [t, t− 1] p [t]
= −∆φi [t, t− 1] p [t− 1]−
1
λ
(∆φi [t, t− 1])
2 −
1
λ
∆φi [t, t− 1]
N∑
j 6=i
dj
[
t−
]
If we now assume that the remaining agents j 6= i form an effective ‘background’
of random demands dj of zero mean, then averaging over this ‘mean-field’ of
agents gives:
〈∆Ci [t, t− 1]〉j = −∆φi [t, t− 1] p [t− 1]−
1
λ
(∆φi [t, t− 1])
2
(14)
Equation 14 tells us that an agent will on average receive an amount of cash
〈∆Ci [t, t− 1]〉, which is equal to the amount he may have naively thought he
would get (if he could have traded at price p [t− 1]) minus a positive amount
proportional to the square of his trade size and inversely proportional to the
market liquidity. Consequently, an agent who considered his market impact
in calculating his wealth would on average expect the cash-equivalent value of
his wealth to be given by Wi [t] − φi [t]
2
/λ, i.e. his notional wealth minus the
average impact from unwinding his position at time t + 1. This is the wealth
that the agents should be attempting to maximize. We could therefore propose,
in the spirit of Ref. [19], a modification to the strategy reward function gR [t]
which takes account of this market impact:
gR [t+ 1] ∝ χ
[
φR [t] ∆p [t+ 1, t]− φR [t]
2
/λ
]
(15)
Let us now re-visit the issue of trend following, this time with reference to a
model whose strategies are updated using Equation 15. We will refer to this
model as $G15. When a trend forms such that φR [t] and ∆p [t+ 1, t] have
the same sign, strategy R will be rewarded: this continues until the moment
when the extra profit gained from increasing the position to benefit from the
favorable price movement, is smaller than the added market impact which would
be faced from unwinding the larger position. At this point the strategy will
start to be penalized instead of rewarded for supporting the trend. This is a
mechanism which could halt the price-divergent behavior of $G11 type models.
However Equation 15 gives the turnover point in strategy reward due to market
impact, to be given by φR [t] = λ∆P [t+ 1, t]. If we then consider that during
an ‘unstable’ market trend the average price change is of order N/λ (see, for
example, the gradient of the $G11 price in Figure 1) - and that φR increments
by only ±1 every timestep - then trends which are formed before the market
impact mechanism starts having a strong effect, will be of order ttrend ∽ N
timesteps in length. The market impact mechanism on its own, is thus clearly
too weak to stabilize the $G models in order to form a realistic price series.
7.2 Agent wealth
Financial agents participating in a real market have finite resources and so
cannot keep buying and/or selling assets indefinitely. This hard cut-off of agents’
resources in turn imposes a hard limit on the magnitude of price trends. This
effect was seen clearly in the $G13 model where the agents were only permitted
(or, equivalently because of finite resources, were only able to) hold one position
at any one time. The $G13 and $G11 models can thus be thought of as opposite
extremes in this respect, i.e. the first mimics extremely tightly-limited resources
while the second mimics infinite resources. It seems natural to expect that
a real financial market lies somewhere between these two extremes; resources
are large for the market-moving agents but still finite. We can include the
effect of limited agent resources in our market model by allocating agent i an
initial capital Ci [0] (and position φi [0]) and then updating this capital using
Ci [t] = Ci [t− 1]−∆φi [t, t− 1] p [t] [4]. The agents cannot then trade at time
t if the following conditions are met:
∆φi [t, t− 1] > 0 ∩ Ci [t− 1] < ∆φi [t, t− 1] p [t− 1]
∆φi [t, t− 1] < 0 ∩ φi [t− 1] < 0
In other words, an agent will not submit a buy order unless he at least has the
capital to buy the asset at the quoted price p [t− 1], and also will not submit an
order to short sell if he already holds a short position. If we imposed no limit
on short selling, an unstable state of the system would exist wherein all agents
short-sell indefinitely.
We will refer to this model as $G11W where W represents ‘wealth’.
Let us initialize this market model with agent wealths such that the agents’
initial buying power is equal to their initial selling power, i.e. {Ci [0] , φi [0]} =
{n× p [0] , n− 1} . Hence initially, the agents have the power to buy or sell n
assets (N.B. recall that they are allowed up to one short sell). If we then raise n
from n = 1 upwards, we can see a qualitative change in the dynamical behavior
of the model between the two extremes of $G13 and $G11, with the periods of
trending growing longer as n increases. To investigate this behavior numerically,
we fix n and run the model for 1500 timesteps, recording the value of the global
information µ [t] in the last 500 timesteps t. We then count the number of
times within this last 500 timesteps that either µ = 0 (implying negative price
movements over the last m timesteps) or µ = P − 1 (positive price movements)
occur. We denote the frequency with which these states occur as ftrend. If
the model visited all states of the global information µ [t] equally, we would
expect ftrend = 1/P . Figure 2, showing the variation of ftrend with n, has
several interesting features. First it can be seen that, as n is increased and the
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Figure 2: The frequency of occurence of the global information states µ = 0, P−
1, ftrend, as a function of the agents’ capital resource level n. The results were
taken from the last 500 timesteps of a 1500 timestep simulation. The market
model used was $G11W, with evolving agent wealths. The model parameters
were N = 501, m = 3, s = 2, T = 100, and r = 4, with binary (χ = sgn)
strategy rewards. The solid line represents equally visited µ-states.
consequent wealth available to the agents grows, the tendency of the model to be
dominated by price trending increases dramatically. Also we see that at low n,
ftrend is below that of the (random) equally visited µ-states case. This is due to
the high degree of anti-persistence in the system as was seen in the $G11 model.
The large spread in the results arises from the tendency of the model to exhibit
clustering of activity states: persistence follows persistence and anti-persistence
follows antipersistence as described in Section 6.
We note that in the work of Giardina and Bouchaud (see Refs. [6, 15])
the strategy payoff function has the same basic form as Eq. 13, i.e. it is a
$G13W-style model. These authors consider proportional scoring (i.e. χ = 1)
and include an interest rate which resembles a resource level L; these features
will not change the qualitative results presented here. However, in the models of
Refs. [6, 15], it seems that only active strategies are rewarded thereby breaking
the common perception of a given strategy’s success among agents which is
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arguably a central feature of the binary model structure. We expect this to
dramatically affect the dynamical properties of the system as the mechanism
for agent coordination and thus crowd formation has been altered.
7.3 Diversity and timescales
The interesting dynamical behavior of market models based on the binary strat-
egy approach of the MG, arises largely as a consequence of the heterogeneity in
the strategies held by the agents and the common perception of a strategy’s suc-
cess. The extent to which agents will agree on the best course of action, and the
consequent crowding, is solely a function of how the 2P available strategies are
distributed amongst the population of agents. If the way in which the strategies
are initially allocated is biased, then the resulting dynamics will reflect this [6].
The introduction of an agent wealth, as discussed in the previous subsection,
also brings about diversity in the market model. Even if we initiate the model
with all agents having an equal allocation of wealth in the form of cash plus
assets, the wealths of the agents {Wi} will soon become heterogenous as a
direct result of their heterogenous strategies. Figure 3 shows the heterogeneity
of agents’ wealth growing with time during a $G11W simulation. After many
timesteps have elapsed, the distribution of agents’ wealth seems to reach a
steady-state: many agents have lost the majority of their wealth to a minority of
agents who themselves have accumulated much more. In everyday terminology,
‘the rich get richer while the poor get poorer’.
The heterogeneity of agents’ wealth in the $G11W model is fed back into
the system through the buying power of the agents alone. However, although
wealthier agents have the potential to buy and sell more assets, they still only
trade in single quanta of the asset at any given timestep, the same as poorer
agents. It may be more reasonable to propose that the agents trade in sizes
proportional to their resources [4, 6], i.e.
∆φi [t, t− 1] = γ
Ci [t− 1]
p [t− 1]
for a
µ[t−1]
R∗
i
= 1
∆φi [t, t− 1] = γφi [t− 1] for a
µ[t−1]
R∗
i
= −1
where R∗i is the highest scoring strategy R of agent i. The factor γ then enumer-
ates what fraction of the agents’ resources (cash for buying, assets for selling)
they will transact at any given time. In this system, assets will generally need
to be divisible, i.e. the sense of agents buying and selling a quanta of the asset
as in $G11W is lost. This in turn means that instead of the degree of trending
being controlled by the level of initial resource allocation n, it is instead de-
termined by n/γ, since this effectively determines the number of trades agents
can make in any trending period before hitting the boundary of their capital
resources. Also with this system of trading in proportion to wealth, trends will
start steep and end shallow as agents run out of resources and thus make smaller
and smaller trades. Apart from these stylized differences, the system has a very
similar dynamical behavior to the more straight-forward $G11W model.
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Figure 3: Distributions of the agents’ wealth Wi at four different times t during
evolution of a $G11W model. Initially all agents were allocated the same re-
sources {Ci [0] , φi [0]} = {3p [0] , 2} with the initial price p [0] = 10. Parameters
for the simulation were N = 1001, m = 3, s = 2, T = 100, and r = 4, with
binary (χ = sgn) strategy rewards.
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Figure 4: Examples of the dynamical behavior of the price p [t] and volume∑N
i=1 |di| of the $G11W model, for three different degrees of crowding given by
the memory length m. The parameters of the simulation are N = 501, s = 2,
T = 100, r = 4, and n = 3, with binary (χ = sgn) strategy rewards.
Diversity in strategies and wealth are the two big sources of agent hetero-
geneity that we have covered so far. This agent heterogeneity has led to a
market model with dynamical behavior which is interesting and diverse over a
large parameter range. However, the typical price/volume output only starts
to become representative of a real financial market at higher m, as can be seen
in Figure 4. As discussed in Section 6, the high m regime represents a ‘dilute’
market where very few traders act in a coordinated fashion. However one would
expect that a real financial market is not in a dilute phase at all, since it does
have large groups of agents forming crowds which rush to the market together,
thereby creating the bursty activity pattern observed empirically. Why then
does this model, when pushed into the low m regime, produce endless bubbles
of positive and negative speculation as shown in the left-hand panel of Fig. 4.
Although a real financial market does show some suggestion of oscillatory bub-
ble formation, it is nowhere near so pronounced and is certainly not on such a
short timescale2.
To answer this question, we push further the subject of agent diversity.
Although our agents may have differing sets of strategies and consequently dif-
ferent wealths, they all act on the same timescale. When we look at charts
such as Figure 4, we see patterns not only on a small tick-by-tick scale but also
on a much larger scale. In fact we can identify patterns all the way up to the
2We assume implicitly here that a ‘timestep’ in our model corresponds to a fairly short
interval in real time. The reason for this is that a timestep is the amount of time it takes for
an agent to re-assess his strategies. For large, market moving, agents this amount of time is
likely to be less than one day.
19
‘macro’ scale of the boom-bust speculatory bubbles. From a knowledge of these
patterns, we would form opinions about what will happen next and would trade
accordingly to maximize our wealth. The agents we have modelled, however,
cannot view the past price-series in this way; instead they are forced to only
consider patterns of length m timesteps. Patterns of any length greater than
this, go un-noticed by the agents and hence are not traded upon. This explains
why these patterns can arise and survive. By contrast, when a pattern is traded
upon (even in the non-MG framework) it is slowly removed from the market.
Consider the following pattern:
time t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
price p [t] 14 10 11 12 13 15 14 10 11 12 13 15 14 10
If we were able to identify this pattern repeating, our best course of action
would be to submit a buy order between times t = 1 and t = 2, i.e. a [1] = 1.
We could then buy the asset at p [2] = 10. Then between times t = 5 and 6, we
would submit an order to sell: a [5] = −1 and hence would have sold the asset
at p [6] = 15. We then continue: a [7] = 1, a [11] = −1... This ensures we always
buy at the bottom price and sell at the top. However, trading in this way is
against the trend as a [t]A [t] < 0. It is in effect minority trading. Hence trading
to maximize our wealth with respect to this pattern, leads to the weakening of
the pattern itself just as in the MG. We conclude therefore that the presence
of strong patterns in the $G11W and other similar market models at low m, is
simply due to the absence of agents within the model who can identify these
patterns and arbitrage them out.
From the proceeding discussion, it is clear that a realistic market model
should include agents who can analyze the past series of asset price movements
over different time-scales. A first thought on how to do this, is to include a
heterogeneity in the memory length m of the agents. In this framework, agents
look at patterns not only of differing length but also of differing complexity. It
is therefore appealing to propose a generalization to the way in which the agents
interpret the global information of past price movements, in such a way as to
allow observation of patterns over different times-scales but having the same
complexity (m). This can be simply achieved by allowing the agents to have a
natural information bit-length τ such that the global information available to
them µτ [t] is updated according to the following generalization of Equation 7:
µτ [t+ 1] = 2µτ [t]− P H
[
µτ [t]−
P
2
]
+H [∆P [t+ 1, t+ 1− τ ]]
The table below then shows how the previous pattern would be encoded by
agents having τ = 1, 2, 3, 4:
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time t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
price p [t] 14 10 11 12 13 15 14 10 11 12 13 15 14 10
‘best’ action a∗ [t] 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1
sgn [∆P [t, t− 1]] − + + + + − − + + + + − −
sgn [∆P [t, t− 2]] − + + + + − − + + + + −
sgn [∆P [t, t− 3]] − + + + − − − + + + −
sgn [∆P [t, t− 4]] − + + − − − − + + −
If each agent only considered the past two bits of information, i.e. m = 2,
then the ‘best’ strategies for different values of the information bit-length τ
would be as shown in the table below. These ‘best’ strategies have been obtained
from inspection of the table above; in particular, by looking at when the different
m = 2 bitstrings {−−,−+,+−,++} occur and seeing the respective ‘best’
action given this bit string a∗ [t].
τ
µ [t]
1 2 3 4
−− 1 1 1 ?
−+ 1 1 −1 −1
+− 1 1 1 1
++ ? ? ? 1
The ‘best’ strategies (aR∗) in the above table, show a question mark (?)
next to a particular value of the global information µ [t]. This denotes that for
this state, the best action is sometimes a
µ[t]
R∗ = 1 and sometimes a
µ[t]
R∗ = −1.
It can thus be seen that only when we include longer time-scale patterns τ >
2, do we get a clear signal of when is the optimal time to sell (a
µ[t]
R∗ = −1).
Shorter timeframe patterns provide no clear indication when to do so3. This
then demonstrates that an agent holding strategies of different bit-length τ could
identify optimal times to buy and sell, and hence arbitrage patterns of length
very much greater than the memory length m.
7.4 Exogenous information
So far this section has discussed how instabilities and inefficiencies in the model
market (as indicated by repeating, un-arbitraged patterns) could be remedied by
inclusion of more realistic, sophisticated and diverse strategic agents. However
the agents we have considered have all acted in the same fashion, i.e. with the
goal of maximizing their wealth by employing a strategic methodology based
on the observable endogenous market indicators. In terms of a real financial
market, we have considered modelling the subset of agents who consider the past
history of asset price movements as the only relevant information. Although in
reality we expect this subset to be large, we certainly acknowledge the presence
of agents who strategically use other endogenous market indicators such as
3In this case a single m = 3 strategy could encode enough information to optimally arbi-
trage the pattern. However in general, for longer patterns, this is less likely to be true.
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volume as a source of global information. The strategic use of other endogenous
market indicators simply gives a more sophisticated model within the same basic
framework.
What we have so far neglected to include is the presence of agents using
exogenous information to influence their trading decisions. Possible sources
of exogenous information are as vast as human imagination itself: they could
for example range from economic indicators through to company reports and
rumor, or even ‘gut-feeling’ and astrology! Within the context of our model
framework, strategies employed based on these external sources of information
are un-strategic with respect to the endogenous information, and as such repre-
sent a stochastic influence.
Such stochasticity, representing the response of agents to exogenous infor-
mation, can be incorporated into the models in a variety of ways. For example
a background level of stochastic action could be assumed at each timestep, or
be made to appear as a Poisson process with a given mean frequency. How-
ever, it seems most physically satisfying to incorporate stochastic action in the
form of an extra pair of strategies for each (or at least some) agent: one buy
strategy, aR = 1, and one sell strategy, aR = −1. Agents could then be given
a probability of using each of these strategies in place of their ‘usual’ chartist
strategies. Furthermore, the probabilities of using these strategies could be al-
lowed to evolve. This system of modelling response to an exogenous signal is
essentially the ‘Genetic Game’ of Ref. [20]. Alternatively, the probability of
using one of these strategies representing the response to an exogenous signal,
could be based on an endogenous market indicator. An example of this is the
mechanism of Ref. [6] of switching to ‘fundamentalist behavior’. In the model
of Ref. [6], agents use strategy aR = sgn [p0 − p [t]] with a probability f which
increases with |p [t]− p0|, where p0 represents a perceived ‘fundamental’ value
for the asset. This mechanism, which can be thought of as encoding the be-
havior of irrational fear, clearly acts to break the formation of long trends since
the probability of trading against the trend increases with the duration of the
trend itself. More generally, we suspect that among the agent-based market
models in the literature which manage to reproduce stylized facts, the inclusion
of some level of stochasticity within the model is crucial for helping to break up
unphysical dynamics and hence achieve market-like behavior.
8 Strategy structure
In the framework of the MG, each strategy aR comprises the elements a
µ
R which
represent a response {−1, 1} to each of the possible P values of the global
information µ (see Section 2). In Section 4, we identified the different states
of the global information µ as corresponding to different patterns in the past
history of asset price movements (binary: up/down). We can therefore think
of a strategy as a book of chartist principles recommending an action for each
and every possible pattern of length m. Each of these strategy ‘books’ thus has
2m pages, one for each pattern. There are 22
m
possible books an agent can buy
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and use as guidelines on how to trade. An agent in possession of one of these
strategy ‘books’, whichever he chooses to buy, can find a page giving guidelines
on how to trade in every possible market state. The books are thus ‘complete’.
It seems unlikely however, that in reality such a ‘complete’ book would exist
for any arbitrary value of m. Indeed, even if such a book did exist, it is unlikely
that a given market participant would consider all the pages as being true.
For example, page one of a strategy book may say that if the asset price has
fallen three days running, one should sell assets on the fourth day. Page three
may say that if the asset price has fallen, then recovered and then fallen again,
it is advisable to buy. The agent holding this book may well believe in page
one but think that the guidelines of page three are rubbish: in particular, he
considers the pattern down-up-down to correspond to no trading signal at all.
This agent would therefore continue to hold any previous position he had if
he saw the pattern down-up-down. We therefore propose a generalization to
the strategy structure of the MG to account for the fact that strategy ‘books’
may be incomplete, or equivalently that agents do not trust some of the trading
signals.
Before trading commences, each agent goes through each of her (complete)
strategy ‘books’ page by page, and decides whether she believes in the trading
guidelines given for each of the possible P = 2m market ‘signals’. The agents
choose to accept each page of each of their books with a probability pa. If the
agent rejects a page of the strategy ‘book’, they replace the suggested action for
time t, i.e. a
µ[t]
R ∈ [−1, 1], by a null action a
µ[t]
R = ∗. When trading commences,
the agents are then faced with deciding what course of action to take when
their strategy ‘books’ register the null action at time t. One type of possible
behavior would be to maintain their prior course of action, i.e. a
µ[t]
R = a
µ[t−1]
R .
Another alternative behavior would be to maintain their prior position, i.e.
φi
[
(t+ 1)−
]
= φi [t]. (This results in a
µ[t]
R = 0 in $G11 type models and
a
µ[t]
R = a
µ[t−1]
R in $G13 models).
We now examine the qualitative differences between a model with this in-
complete strategy structure, and a model with complete strategies. For this
purpose we will assume a GCMG type model, i.e. a model with strategy payoff
given by Equation 14. Figure 5 shows the resulting price and volume from two
market simulations with incomplete strategies, the probability of non-null ac-
tion being pa = 0.3. These are compared with the GCMG which has complete
strategies.
The top-left chart of Figure 5 shows price and volume for a market where
agents maintain their previous course of action when they encounter a null
strategy action. This market shows high volatility in price, a high number of
very large movements, and a background of high volume trading with occasional
sharp spikes. We suggest that this behavior arises from the tendency of agents
to keep repeating their previous action in the absence of a new market pattern.
4We use the GCMG to contrast the effects of incomplete strategies, since its dynamics are
familiar and have been well-studied. However our previous comments regarding the short-
comings of the MG strategy payoff structure, should be kept in mind since they still hold.
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Figure 5: The contrast between the behaviour of models with incomplete strat-
egy ‘books’ to those with complete ones. The top two figures show price and
volume for a GCMG type model with incomplete strategies, pa = 0.3. The top
left chart represents a market of agents who maintain their previous action when
they encounter a null strategy response a
µ[t]
R = ∗. The top right chart represents
a market of agents who maintain their position. The bottom chart shows the
behavior of the GCMG for comparison. The parameters in all the models are
N = 501, s = 2, T = 100, and r = 4, with binary (χ = sgn) strategy rewards.
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Clearly then the ‘large-movement’ states of up-up-up or down-down-down will
be occupied for longer than the ‘ranging’ states (up-down-up etc.) because
these are the only states of µ which can map onto themselves (µ [t] = µ [t+ 1] =
µ [t+ 2] . . . ) thus providing no new market pattern.
The top right chart of Figure 5 shows price and volume for a market where
agents maintain their previous position (i.e. a
µ[t]
R = 0 in this model) when they
encounter a null strategy action. The volume in this market simulation is very
low, giving a consequent low volatility. This is due to the fact that the agents
will not trade unless they receive a market signal for which they have a non-null
strategy action. This model still shows a high probability for price movements
which are large compared to the volatility. These large movements occur in
moments of high agent coordination, i.e. when many agents find they have a
strategy with the same non-null action. However in contrast to the previous
model, these large movements don’t seem to persist over many timesteps.
It is interesting to compare the statistical features of these models featur-
ing incomplete strategies, with the features of the GCMG. Figure 6 shows the
volatility and kurtosis of the price movements ∆P [t+ 1, t] for a model with
incomplete strategies, as a function of the probability pa that a strategy has a
non-null action for a given global information state. The market model used
has the structure of the GCMG (N.B. for pa = 1, it is the GCMG) and features
the behavior wherein agents maintain their previous course of action when they
encounter a null strategy action. As a consequence, the volatility of the price
movements rises as pa is reduced since it leads to more persistence of agent
action and consequently bigger asset price movements. This affect can also be
seen in the kurtosis which grows rapidly away from the Gaussian case, since the
probability of large moves increases with falling pa. [For more details on the
nature of large movements in the GCMG, we refer to Ref. [21].]
9 Market clearing
In the preceding sections we have discussed mechanisms through which financial
market agents come to make trading decisions about whether to buy or sell an
asset. In Section 3 we made some suggestions about how the combined action
of all these agents’ decisions produced a demand, and how that demand then
affected the movement of the asset price. So far we have not explicitly mentioned
a mechanism by which the market clears, i.e. by which sellers of the asset meet
buyers. The discussion of specific clearing mechanisms amounts to a discussion
of specific market microstructure. However our goal here is to seek to be as
general as possible, and hence not limit the scope of our market models to any
particular sector or style of financial market. We thus limit ourselves here to a
simplistic discussion of market-making.
The first important aspect of the models we have considered so far is that
the agents make a decision about whether to buy or sell assets at time t based
only on the information up to (but not including) time t. The orders as such
are considered as ‘market orders’ because they are unconditional on the actual
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Figure 6: The volatility and kurtosis for a market model with incomplete strate-
gies, as a function of the probability pa that a strategy will have a non-null action
for a given global information state. Circles correspond to values taken over the
last 1000 timesteps of a 2000 timestep run. The model parameters are N = 501,
s = 2, T = 100, and r = 4, with binary (χ = sgn) strategy rewards.
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traded price p [t]. Orders whose execution depends on the traded price p [t] are
known as ‘limit orders’ and are beyond the scope of the model types presented
here.
The presence of only market orders in our model brings us to the second
important consideration: the number of buy orders in general does not balance
the number of sell orders, i.e. in general D [t] 6= 0 since all orders seek execution
at time t irrespective of the price. There are two options then of how the market
could function. The first option is to assume that the number of assets sold by
the agents must equal the number bought by the agents. In this case the total
number of assets traded is given by,
vassets [t] = min
[
nbuy
[
t−
]
, nsell
[
t−
]]
where nbuy is the number of agents who seek to buy, and nsell the number who
seek to sell. With this system, the agents in the majority group (buyers or
sellers) only get their order partially executed: for example if nbuy = 40 and
nsell = 50, the sellers can each only sell vassets [t] /nsell = 40/50 = 80% of a
quanta of assets. This is the system proposed in Ref. [6]. An alternative system
assumes that there is a third party, a market-maker, who operates between
buyers and sellers and makes sure that each and every order is fulfilled by
taking a position in the asset herself. We then have that:
vassets [t] = max
[
nbuy
[
t−
]
, nsell
[
t−
]]
and that the market-maker’s inventory is:
φM [t] = φM [t− 1]−D
[
t−
]
(16)
The market-maker, unlike the agents who just seek to maximize their wealth, has
the joint goals of wealth maximization and staying market-neutral, i.e. as close
to φM [t] = 0 as possible. If the nature of the market is highly mean-reverting,
the second of these conditions will be automatically true since
∑t
j=0D [t] ∼ 0.
In these circumstances, the market-maker should employ an arbitrage-free price
formation process such as Equation 3 or Equation 4. If on the other hand the
market is not mean-reverting, then the market-maker’s position is unbounded.
In these circumstances a market-maker should employ a price-formation process
such as Equation 5 which encourages mean reversion through manipulation
of the asset price based on
∑t
j=0D [t], as described in Section 3. A market-
maker using a price formation such as Equation 5 can however be arbitraged
by the agents. Whether the market-maker is actually arbitraged is then purely
dependent on the underlying dynamics of the market.
Let us demonstrate this by following Ref. [5] using a $G13 model. For this
model we have:
D
[
t−
]
= A [t− 1]−A [t− 2] (17)
as shown in Section 5. From Equation 16 we then get that φM [t] =
∑t−1
j=0D [t] =
φM [0]− A [t− 1] This immediately tells us that the market-maker’s inventory
27
is bounded. The natural choice of price formation process to use would then be
the arbitrage-free case of, for example, Equation 3. If we combine Equation 3
with Equation 17 we arrive at:
p [t] = p [0] e
A[t−1]
λ (18)
We can thus see how the $G13 model produced the tightly bounded, jumpy
price series seen in Figure 1: the price at time t is no longer directly dependent
on the price at time t− 1 and is bounded by p [0] e−
N
λ ≤ p [t] ≤ p [0] e
N
λ .
Given the behavior of the $G13 model, the use of the price formation process
of Equation 5 seems rather unnecessary: the market maker does not need to
manipulate the price in order to stay market-neutral on average. However, let us
demonstrate the effect of using Equation 5 as in Ref. [5]. Combining Equations
5 and 17 with the market maker’s inventory of φM [t] = −A [t− 1] we arrive at:
p [t] = p [t− 1] exp
[
1
λ
A [t− 1] +
(
1
λM
−
1
λ
)
A [t− 2]
]
(19)
Unlike Equation 18, Equation 19 gives us again a multiplicative price process
for finite values of λM . Although it seems an inappropriate step, we would
thus expect that introducing Equation 5 as a price formation process would
help regain some of the ‘stylized features’ of a financial market inherent from
the multiplicative price process. However, closer consideration of Equation 19
reveals something different. Let us consider the case of A [t− 2] = A [t− 1].
In this case the price change is simply an increasing function of A [t− 1]. If
more agents are long rather than short at time t (A [t− 1] > 0), then the
price movement ∆P [t, t− 1] is positive. The agents will then have benefitted
from a positive increment in their notional wealth from simply holding their
position. This manipulation of the (naive) market-maker leads to an unstable
state whereby the agents arbitrage the market-maker simply by holding their
long/short positions and watching the price rise/fall. This unstable state of
the market will occur with increasing probability as the agents become more
coordinated in their actions, i.e. as m is decreased. For high m, where there
is no longer significant agent coordination and no crowding affects, the $G13
model with Equation 19 for the price formation is able to avoid the unstable
attractor and thus produce more ‘market-like’ time-series as demonstrated in
Ref. [5]. We can also examine the changing wealth of the market-maker by
simply employing Equation 9. We know that φM [t] = −A [t− 1], so Equation
9 combined with Equation 19 gives us:
∆WM [t+ 1, t] = φM [t] ∆P [t+ 1, 1]
= −
1
λ
A [t]A [t− 1]−
(
1
λM
−
1
λ
)
A [t− 1]2 (20)
In the case of λM = λ as in Ref. [5], we see can see - by taking a time average
of Equation 20 - that whether the market-maker’s wealth increases or decreases
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with time will depend on the dynamics of the market. If the market is per-
sistent as in the unstable case at low m, the market maker loses wealth since
〈A [t]A [t− 1]〉 > 0. Conversely if the market is anti-persistent, the market-
maker will gain wealth since 〈A [t]A [t− 1]〉 < 0.
At first sight, it therefore seems that the $G13 model can generate a ‘reason-
ably market-like’ state wherein the price is not unstable, it exhibits market-like
dynamics and has a market-maker who is able to make a profit from her role.
However, in order to generate this state it was necessary to use what seems to
be an inappropriate market-making mechanism and also push the model into
the uncrowded phase. Neither of these choices seem desirable in the quest for
producing a realistic market model.
10 Conclusion
Following the introduction to the community of the Minority Game, there have
been many proposed agent based market models, many of which exhibit the
‘stylized facts’ of financial market timeseries in certain parameter ranges. It
seems however that many of these market models include one or more basic
assumptions which seem implausible when compared to the actions of real fi-
nancial market agents.
With the first ‘wave’ of market models it seemed remarkable that so many of
the stylized features of real financial timeseries were reproduced so well. With
more and more market model contenders entering the community, each with
a quite diverse set of assumptions, it started to look as though it was easy
to find models which would reproduce realistic market-like dynamics. It has
been proposed [15] that general systems which have activity based on a waiting
time problem, will all enjoy the scaling properties seen in financial market data.
Notwithstanding this observation, we believe that it is not at all obvious how one
can produce a self-consistent market model which embodies, in a non-stochastic
way, the behavior of realistic financial market agents, and yet can reproduce
the ‘stylized facts’ of real financial markets. As we have shown in this work,
adaptation of the MG payoff structure to incorporate a more realistic objective
function results in a model increasingly dominated by trending as agents’ re-
sources are increased. As a result of this we are forced to look to a wider class
of agent behavior and heterogeneity in order to recover the dynamical behavior
we are looking for.
This paper has provided a discussion of different aspects of market models
and how they interact with each other. Instead of proposing a unique new mar-
ket model of our own (thereby adding to the increasing family in the literature),
we have examined the different features one may want to include in a market
model, and then discussed what their effect would be. We hope that the re-
sulting discussion has managed to provide a basic of toolbox of model features,
brought together by a common formalism. Perhaps some optimal combination
of a subset of these model features will provide a new self-consistent, realistic
yet minimal market model. However it is likely that one needs a diversity not
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only of agent parameter values but also of agent behavior, if one is intent on
forming the market model.
Finally we emphasize that this paper falls into the category of an interim
progress report on our research in this area to date - a synthesis of our work
over the past few years and thoughts, particularly in light of recent proposals
for modified agent-based models. We would therefore welcome any comments
and, in particular, criticisms of our results and opinions. We also thank the
many people with whom we have enjoyed discussions about financial modelling,
both within and outside the Econophysics community.
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